

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 2003

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CONCURRING OPINION

COMMISSIONER THOMAS J. JOSEPIAK

I concur with the Commission's unanimous decision in Advisory Opinion 1986-31 that contribution limits for individuals and PACs under \$441a(a) should be applied separately for both the regular and special general elections for U.S. Senate in Morth Carolina on November 4, 1986. This conclusion is entirely consistent with prior Commission interpretation of the Act and regulations. In Advisory Opinion 1984-42, in which the requestor was a Congressional candidate in simultaneous special and regular elections, the Commission concluded that separate contribution limits apply to each election, stating:

"...[A] Ithough both the special election and the general election will be held on the same day, the requirements that a condidate's man appear twice on the ballot, and that the veter day cast two separate votes, support the conclusion that [the requestor] will be a candidate in two distinct elections."

I regret, however, that the Commission could not agree to follow this straightforward logic and reach a majority decision as to the application of \$441a(d)(3) and \$441a(h) party expenditure and contribution limits in Advisory Opinion 1986-31. Those opposed to separate party support limits for the two elections apparently could not accept the "doubling" (although that characterization is not accurate) of permissible party contributions and expenditures for what they instinctively feel is really one election, since these two legally distinct elections are being held on the same day and involve the same candidates.

Bolstered by an imaginative analysis by the General Counsel, those opposed to separate party support limits sought to fashion an exception for this unusual situation. This exception to the general direction of the Act is incapable

of articulation by a rule of law or legal theory, apart from simply reciting the circumstances of these particular elections. The supporters of this exception concede it would not apply if the elections were not held on the same day or if either or both parties had chosen to nominate different candidates for the unexpired and full Senate terms. The Commission would almost certainly never apply this exception in any other special and regular election circumstance.

The General Counsel's proposed draft relied upon variation in statutory language within these provisions and inconclusive legislative history to justify an ad hoc interpretation of the law's intended effect. The General Counsel essentially argued that semantical differences between provisions of the Act, and the absence of clear refutation in the legislative history, licence the Commission to construct an exception that Congress arguably would or should have adopted had it anticipated this situation. I strongly believe the presumption should work in the other direction, and that free speech and political expression are not limited or prohibited without specific statutory language in the FECA or an affirmative and fairly clear expression of intent in the legislative history.

I consider the General Counsel's view to be a dangerous proposition unsupported in the law and wholly unjustified for this unique and relatively benign set of circumstances. Increased party support for candidates, where the candidates and parties are being treated equally, does not constitute a threat to our political system warranting extraordinary Commission action. Whether the Commission has the discretionary authority to manufacture exceptions to avoid clearly perverse or blatantly unfair consequences is a different question. That question is not raised here merely because of perceived or potential partisan "advantage."

Section 441a(d)(3) provides that the national committee of a political party, or the state committee of a political party (including any subordinate committee of a state committee) may not make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for the U.S. Senate in a state, who is affiliated with such party which exceeds 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the state. The legislative history makes clear that, but for this provision, such expenditures by these party committees would be subject to the contribution limitations of 2 U.S.C. 5441a(a). See H.R. Rep. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1976), reprinted in FEC Legislative Mistory of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 at 1053 (1977).

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The Act and Commission regulations do not define "campaign," and that term does not appear to have independent meaning in \$441a(d)(3) within the phrase "general election campaign." The General Counsel, however, seized upon the word "campaign" to concoct a "really just one campaign" theory to justify denying the parties separate coordinated expenditure limits for the two general elections being held for U.S. Senate in North Carolina in 1986. This one-campaign concept, which would apparently be uniquely applied to interpreting \$441a(d)(3), is flatly inconsistent with all the Act's provisions which do not use the word "campaign" --- a speculative leap into Congress' intent with a dubious result unsupported by the legislative history. Implementation of the one-campaign concept would call for a nightware of subjective line-drawing.

What, for example, would the General Counsel recommend if one of the parties had chosen a titular, nominal candidate for the unexpired term and a genuine candidate for the full term, and the two candidates of the same party conducted their campaigns in absolute tandem, virtually as "one campaign" (except separate reporting)? Would the campaigns be determined to really be just one campaign, and the party be afforded only one \$441a(d)(3) expenditure limit? Would it matter if one was ahead in the polls and one behind? Or would that party be allowed two \$441a(d)(3) limits because it has two different candidates on the ballot, but the other party be allowed only one limit because it is fielding the same candidate in both elections?

The General Counsel's analysis breaks down in application, because it is simply an excuse to decide in this special case that parties are not permitted two separate \$441a(d)(3) expenditure limits for the two general elections. The far more simple and appropriate legal analysis, despite the unusual consequences, is to recognize that Commission regulations define "general elections" to include both (1) the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in even-numbered years, and (2) a special election to fill a vacancy and which results in the final selection of a single individual to the office at stake. See 11 CFR 100.2(b). The Commission has previously decided that coordinated party expenditures within the limitations of \$441a(d)(3) are permissible in connection with a special election that qualifies as a general election. See Advisory Opinion 1983-16. Nothing in the Act, Commission regulations or previous advisory opinions suggests any further limitation because the two general elections occur on the same day or involve the same candidates. In Advisory Opinion 1980-119, the Commission rejected the expanding of \$441a(d)(3) party expenditure

limits based upon a calculation of "political effectiveness" of the expenditures, and the Commission should not read into the statute any further restricting of the limits based upon a similarly subjective "one campaign" analysis.

Section 2 U.S.C. §441a(h) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act, amounts totaling not more than \$17,500 may be contributed to a candidate for nomination for election, or for election, to the United States Senate during the year in which an election is held in which he is such a candidate, by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, or the national committee or a political party, or any combination of such committees." Commission regulations further provide that any "contribution made by the committees to a Senate candidate in a year other than that election year shall be considered to be part of the \$17,500 total contribution limit for that election year." 11 CFR 110.2(c).

The contribution limitation of \$441a(h) was specifically intended to supplant the contribution limitations of 2 U.S.C. \$441a(a)(2)(A) that otherwise would limit contributions by party committees in each primary, runoff or general election phase of an election cycle. The provision substitutes a consolidated limit for direct contributions by party committees to Senate candidates irrespective of the timing or even the occurrence of primary or runoff elections. The legislative history of this provision indicates Congress intended to broaden the flexibility afforded to party committees in the timing of their direct contributions to Senate candidates. See 122 Cong. Rec. 7, 191-94 (1976), reprinted in FEC Legislative History of Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 at 457-60 (1977).

I would concede that the statutory language of \$441a(h) is different and presents a more difficult task of interpretation than \$441a(a) or \$441a(d)(3). I would not agree, however, that the language choice evinces a dramatically different intent by Congress or provides the Commission unlimited opportunity for speculating about exceptions to the statutory scheme.

Proponents of the General Counsel's interpretation, denying separate party contributions for the two elections, ascribed great significance to the 'calendar year' limitation. "during the year in which an election is held"). The draft proposed by General Counsel recognized the distinction in \$441a(h) is "an election cycle' limitation rather than a 'per election' one."

The legislative history regarding this provision does not make clear what Congress intended in the event of simultaneous special and regular general elections for different terms of a U.S. Senate seat, and it is unlikely that such a unique circumstance was anticipated at its adoption. Although \$441a(h) replaces the "each election" contribution limitations of \$441a(a), nothing in the legislative history suggests an intention by Congress to depart from the Act's focus upon an election cycle that culminates in a general election, or that the calendar year limitation was meant to preclude separate contributions for separate Senate terms and separate election cycles.

The special and regular elections for U.S. Senate held in North Carolina on November 4, 1986, qualify under the Act and regulations as separate and distinct general elections. See Advisory Opinions 1986-31 and 1984-42. Under North Carolina law, had the vacancy in the Senate seat occurred prior to the tenth day before the period for candidate filing was to end, the parties' nominations of candidates to fill the vacancy would have been decided through primary elections and, potentially, runoff elections. Both the special and regular general elections, therefore, represent the culmination of election cycles as contemplated by \$441a(h). See 11 CFR 100.3(b).

The legislative history also indicates that the original language in S. 3065 provided for consolidated party contributions "with respect to any or all of the elections in which such candidates seek office during an election year" (emphasis added). Id. During the legislative process, the language finally adopted became "during the year in which an election is held in which he is such a candidate." While I do not want to be guilty of reading too much into wording differences, I think this change of language surely does not support the General Counsel's argument that Congress meant "all elections" when it chose "an election."

Even supporters of the General Counsel's position on this issue would probably admit that two \$441a(h) contribution imits should be allowed under the Act had the special and regular elections been held on different days or had the parties nominated two different candidates for the full and unexpired terms of the Senate seat, despite the calendar year aspect of the provision. I simply find no basis in the statute, the legislative history or the Commission's previous advisory opinions for distinguishing the situation where the same candidates stand for election on the same day for two separate general elections.

The 'calendar year' language in \$441a(h), the provision's distinguishing feature, has been virtually eliminated by the conventional interpretation of Commission regulations at 11 CFR 110.2(c). That regulation has been interpreted to mean that the \$17,500 may be given at any time in the six-year Senate cycle, with the contributions only attributed to the election year rather than restricted to it. It is clear, then, that the 'calendar year' measure is not to be interpreted in isolation or in a manner wildly inconsistent with the rest of the Act. Section 441a(h) is, again, only unique to the degree it unifies the primary, runoff and general elections into one six-year cycle for purposes of its contribution limits.

Finally, for purposes of effecting legislative intent, it is worth noting that the two general elections for U.S. Senate held on November 4, 1986, in North Carolina are for two different, successive six-year terms spanning two Senate election cycles. The candidate standing for election to complete the current six-year term is actually "competing" for the right to receive contributions under the election cycle scheme of \$441a(h) with his predecessor, who may have received \$441a(h) contributions for that seat in 1980, rather than "competing" with the candidate standing for election to the new six-year term. That issue was resolved in Advisory Opinion 1978-64, in which the Commission concluded that a senatorial campaign committee could contribute to the limits of \$441a(h) to a candidate for U.S. Senate regardless of any amounts the party committees had given to a deceased predecessor seeking the same seat in the same election cycle.

In summary, the request in Advisory Opinion 1986-31 presented uncommon circumstances and unusual consequences, though hardly offensive or unfair to any legally significant degree. Although it is unfortunate that the participants in these elections were not given a clear majority decision. I am grateful the Commission did not approve an unworkable, unsupportable and unwise exception that would contort the law for an unworthy objective.

October 21, 1916

THOMAS J. JOSEPHAR,

COMMISSIONER